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Informality and Macroeconomic Fluctuations
*
 
This paper examines the adjustment of developing country labor markets to macroeconomic 
shocks. It models as having two sectors: a formal salaried (tradable) sector that may or may 
not be affected by union or legislation induced wage rigidities, and an informal (nontradable) 
self-employment sector facing liquidity constraints to entry. This is embedded in a standard 
small economy macro model that permits the derivation of patterns of comovement among 
relative salaried/self-employed incomes, salaried/self-employed sector sizes and the real 
exchange rate with respect to different types of shocks in contexts with and without wage 
rigidities. The paper then explores time series data from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and 
Mexico to test for cointegrating relationships corresponding to the patterns predicted by 
theory. We confirm episodes of expansion of informal self-employment consistent with the 
traditional segmentation views. However, we also identify episodes consistent with the 
sectoral expansion being driven by relative demand or productivity shocks to the 
nontradables sector that lead to “procyclical” behavior of the informal self-employed sector. 
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  The debate over the role of informal workers -those unprotected by labor 
legislation- in the developing country labor market goes back almost half a century.  A 
prominent stream of the literature has intellectual roots perhaps best distilled in Harris 
and Todaro’s (1970) vision of markets segmented by wage setting in the formal sector 
that leaves the traditional sector rationed out of modern salaried employment.
1  The view 
of the informal sector as the inferior segment of a dual labor market, expanding during 
downturns to absorb increased unemployment, became highly influential in the 
International Labor Organization, its Latin America affiliate, the Latin America Regional 
Employment Program (PREALC), and the World Bank.
2   
 
However, dating at least from Hart’s (1973) work in Africa, a parallel stream has 
stressed the sector’s dynamism and the likely voluntary nature of much of the entry into 
informal self-employment.
3  Recent work has called into question the value of the 
conditional income comparisons commonly used to demonstrate the inferiority of 
informal work both on conceptual and empirical grounds
4 and increasingly, theoretical 
discussions of the sector assume mainstream models of worker sectoral selection or 
matching, and the firm.  A group of papers with roots in Lucas (1978), for instance, 
Rauch (1991), Boeri and Garibaldi (2006), de Paula and Scheinkman (2007), Loayza and 
Rigolini (2007) postulate a continuum of entrepreneurial ability and workers sorting 
themselves among different formal and informal sectors of work.  All four view 
informality through the lens of firms avoiding regulation-be it minimum wages, taxes or 
regulation more generally, and study the implications of changes in regulation or overall 
productivity. 
 
                                                 
1 In fact, in Harris and Todaro’s model, the “traditional” sector was the rural sector disposed to migrate. 
However, it represents perhaps the first analytically worked out view of the dual labor market and remains 
highly relevant to the debate over the informal sector and its relative inferiority.  See Schneider and Enste 
(2000) for a more comprehensive review of existing views. A rich theoretical literature is emerging that 
poses more sophisticated mechanisms that relate informality to unemployment. See, for example, Boeri and 
Garibaldi (2006). A rich theoretical literature is emerging that poses more sophisticated mechanisms that 
relate informality to unemployment. See, for example, Boeri and Garibaldi (2006). 
2 For early statements, see Sethuraman (1981), Tokman (1978), Mazumdar (1975), respectively.   
3 See for more recent formulations in this vein, de Soto (1989), Loayza (1996) and Maloney (1999).  
  1Though acknowledging worker self selection among sectors,  two of these that are 
explicitly concerned with the cyclicality of the sector again derive and present evidence 
for the countercyclicality of informality (Loayza and Rigolini 2007) or a correlation of 
informality with unemployment (Boeri and Garibaldi), consistent with the more earlier  
literature described above.  Were it the focus of his paper, Rauch’s formalization of this 
more traditional model of markets segmented, in this case, by a minimum wage generates 
the same pattern.    
 
These papers all investigate important aspects of informality that likely account 
for substantial cross country and time series variation in its level.  However, in this paper, 
we abstract from all but one of  these considerations in the interest of developing a more 
complex set of relationships with the macro economy and, in particular, in explaining 
why in several country-episodes we study, informality appears to be procyclical.  As an 
example, a first look at time series for Mexico suggests cyclical behavior distinct from 
that of a shock absorber during downturns.  Figure 1 plots the evolution of the relative 
salaried/ informal self-employed sector sizes and respective earnings and shows that 
during the recovery of 1987-1991 both the relative size of the informal self-employed 
sector its relative earnings rise, consistent with a procyclical expansion of that sector. 
Since over 80% of self-employed are found in domestic services, transportation, 
commerce, or construction, it is plausible that the boom in real estate and other non-
tradable industries across this period created new opportunities for entrepreneurs. 
However, it is also the case that the subsequent period leading up to the crisis of 1995, 
the countercyclical movements envisaged by more traditional segmentation views appear, 
manifested as a negative comovement of earnings and labor market sector sizes. 
 
 These distinct patterns suggest that the pro- or countercyclicality of the two labor 
market sectors may depend on the sectoral origin of the shocks, and the presence or 
absence of binding wage rigidities. They also suggest that time series data on these series 
may offer potentially useful labor market diagnostics, for instance, in identifying the 
roots of expansion of the informal sector across a given period. However, for such 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 See Maloney (1999), Pratap and Quintin (2006) 
  2diagnostics to be feasible, we need to understand the drivers of the very large observed 
movements in relative wages which in a simple textbook world, would be forced to 
equivalence. Three effects in principle may be at play: barriers to the arbitrage of labor 
earnings due to barriers to entry to either sector either through quantity or price rigidities, 
barriers to arbitraging of returns to capital of the self-employed which are generally not 
separable in labor market surveys from earnings of labor per se, and changes in the skills 
composition of the sectoral work forces.   
 
To capture these effects, we begin by constructing a model of developing country 
labor markets that is firmly rooted in the established advanced country literature. We 
postulate two sectors: a formal salaried (tradable) sector where workers receive a wage 
and are covered by labor legislation or unions; and a nontradable self-employed sector of 
the kind postulated by Lucas (1978) with heterogeneity in level of entrepreneurial ability 
and where, following Evans and Jovanovic (1989) for the US, credit constraints can 
constitute a barrier to entry from salaried work.  Self-employed workers receive a 
variable return to invested capital and their labor which, due to capital adjustment costs 
arising from credit constraints, may deviate from long run equilibrium levels. 
 
  Focusing on these self-employed, or the micro firm sector more generally, as a 
proxy for informality is not unreasonable. For reasons that we do not explore, the self- 
employed or micro firm sector in the countries we study is highly correlated with 
informality as envisaged by the International Labor Organization:  In Argentina 75%, 
Brazil 61%, and Mexico 77% of informal workers, measured as being uncovered by 
social protection, are found in firms of five or fewer workers and most in firms of under 1 
employee. Further, the share of workers that are informal in these firms is over 80%.   
 
We locate this labor market in a standard macroeconomic framework (Obstfeld 
and Rogoff 1996) that allows us to capture additional information on the sectoral origin 
of the shocks through the real exchange rate - a measure of relative prices of tradables 
and nontradables.  This allows us to move beyond simply defining cyclical movements as 
a deviation from trend and to characterize the nature of the shocks driving it. Given the 
  3high concentration of the informal self-employed or micro firms in the nontradables 
sector (81% in Argentina, 84% in Brazil, 83% in Colombia, 87% in Mexico) we are able 
to derive patterns of comovement between the relative returns and relative sizes of 
salaried and self-employed sectors, and the real exchange rate.
5
 
Finally, we introduce potential wage rigidities in the salaried tradable sector. As 
in the classic Harris-Todaro formulation, formalized in Rauch (1991), the labor market 
can become segmented with workers rationed out of salaried/tradable employment and 
being forced into the self-employed/nontradables sector where earnings adjust to equate 
labor supply and demand.  This segmentation gives rise to distinct patterns of 
comovement of the three series in response to productivity or demand shocks.   
   
Thus, we provide an integrated model of LDC labor markets that permits 
developing a typology of comovements of macroeconomic time series that, once 
identified, can help identify the source of shocks and the presence or absence of formal 
sector segmenting distortions. The latter offers an alternative to unreliable conditional 
income comparisons.
6  Empirically, we employ multivariate cointegration techniques to 
establish these predicted patterns of comovement and their evolution over the last two 
decades in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. These countries all have large 
informal self-employed sectors, and have experienced very large movements in levels of 
economic activity, the relative sizes of the two labor market sectors, and real exchange 
rates.
7   
 
                                                 
5  We include utilities, construction, wholesale and retail trade, hospitality, transport, public administration, 
education, health and social work, community service, private household service, and real estate as non 
tradables.   We assign all of agriculture, fishing mining, manufacturing, financial intermediation to 
tradables which probably overstates the share of tradables.  These numbers are for firms of under six 
individuals where possible.  The statistics for the self employed per se are roughly ten percentage points 
higher.  Statistics correspond to most recent available waves of surveys:  for Argentina 2003:1 EPH, Brazil 
PME (2002), Colombian ENH (2004), Mexico ENEU (2004).  
6  Total returns to Informal self employment and salaried employment incorporate differences in taxes, risk 
premia, flexibility, etc all of which will lead to incomes not being equated, even in the absence of 
segmentation.  See Maloney (1999). 
7  In Mexico from 1988-1995, Argentina 1990-1995, and Brazil beginning in 1992, the exchange rate 
appreciated, often dramatically, following stabilization policies that fixed the nominal exchange rate, 
liberalized capital markets, and implemented other reforms.   
  4We confirm episodes of expansion of informal self-employment consistent with 
the traditional segmentation views.  However, we also identify episodes consistent with 
the sectoral expansion being driven by relative demand or productivity shocks to the 




2. A  Model   
 
We consider the case of a small economy that produces two composite goods, 
tradables and nontradables. The salaried sector is assumed to produce tradables (T), the 
numeraire, while the production of nontradables is concentrated in the self-employed 
sector (N)
8. All workers are homogenous when salaried. However, following Lucas 
(1978), self-employed sector individuals (j) differ in terms of entrepreneurial capability, 
φj distributed uniformly on [0,1]. For simplicity, we also normalize the labor force to 
unity so that, provided that the economy is not in a corner solution, the value of 
entrepreneurial ability of individual m, who is indifferent between salaried work and self-
employment, also corresponds to the size of the salaried labor force.  That is, φm = φ* = 
LT where φ* is the ability of the individual who is indifferent between self-employment 
and wage work. Thus, we preserve the overall labor supply constraint while building in a 
decrease in the marginal entrepreneurial ability as labor shifts toward self-employment. 
 
Tradable output   is CRS in capital   and labor L T Y T K T: 
. Production of individual j in the self-employed sector 
is given by  . 
()
T T
T T T T T T T L K A L K F A Y
α α − = =
1 ,
N
j j N j k A y
α φ =
 
Labor is mobile across sectors, but entrepreneurs planning to switch sectors must 
accumulate or decumulate their capital before doing so.  Because we appear to observe 
                                                 
8 As usually assumed, one unit of tradables can be transformed into a unit of capital at no cost. The reverse 
is also true. Nontradables can be used only for consumption. Capital can be used for production and then 
consumed (as a tradable) at the end of the same period.  
  5non-arbitraged wage differentials, we assume that, though capital is mobile both 
internationally and across sectors, there are adjustment costs that prevent this from 
happening instantaneously. For the self-employed sector, capital markets are not perfect 
and, as Evans and Jovanovic (1989) demonstrated for the US, entrepreneurs are often 
credit constrained.  We capture this by assuming that those entering self-employment 
must install some capital the period before producing and pay a standard deadweight 














χ , where Ij represents the change 
in capital stock between two successive periods for self-employed individual j and χ is 
inversely related to the speed of adjustment.  ( ) j k h , a linear function of capital 
accumulated by the self-employed individual j. We further assume that individuals 
willing to leave self-employment must dispose of all the capital they have in place before 
they become employed in the salaried sector.
9  This specification ensures that the labor 
market will not adjust fully in one period and that differentials in net remuneration among 
sectors are not instantly arbitraged by labor flows.  This permits us to analyze both steady 
state movements in relative wages, relative sector sizes and exchange rates, but, also 
transitional dynamics.  
 
2.1 The firm 
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where wT,s is the wage (gross) prevailing in the tradables sector at time t=s. The world 
interest rate r, expressed in terms of tradables, is assumed to be constant.  The first order 
conditions are standard: 
 
                                                 
9 This specification ensures that (de)installation costs are always finite. Further, since marginal costs of 
capital (de)installation are increasing, capital adjustment will not happen instantaneously. 
  6()r k f A T T = '            ( 1 )  
() () [ T T T T T w k k f k f A = − ' ]          ( 2 )  
 
 
Because r is the world interest rate expressed in terms of tradables, it must correspond to 
the marginal product of capital in the salaried/tradable sector. The wage prevailing in the 
sector is equal to labor’s marginal productivity.  Because both factors do not shift 
instantaneously across sectors, these two conditions may fail to hold ex-post in the event 
of unanticipated shocks. 
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α )      (4) 
 
where q denotes the shadow price of installed capital in nontradables and p denotes the 
price of nontradables relative to the price of tradables. In other words, p is simply the 
inverse of the real exchange rate defined as the relative price of traded goods in terms of 
non-traded goods.  Equation (3) indicates that investment is positive only for values of q 
larger than 1. Equation (4) is a standard investment Euler equation. In the long run, it 
must also be true for all self-employed individuals that returns to capital equal the market 




j N j N =
−1 α α φ           ( 4 ’ )  
 
  7and that the pivotal individual is indifferent between wage work and self-employment: 
 
() T N N w k pA
N = −




2.2 The Consumer 
As is standard, we assume that the economy is inhabited by an infinitely-lived 
representative consumer whose demand and asset holdings are identified with aggregate 








t C C u U , β . 
Where   and   stand for consumption in the tradables and nontradables sectors. 
 is a linear homogenous function of its arguments and u(.) is isoelastic with 
intertemporal substitution elasticity σ. The β element is the standard time-preference 
factor which is exogenously given. We assume that the representative consumer owns a 
share equal to one of the representative tradable firm and in each entrepreneurial activity, 
and receives dividends.
T C N C
( N T C C , Φ )
10  
 
The representative consumer faces a lifetime budget constraint 
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where national financial wealth  t T t N t t K K B Q , , + + =  is measured in terms of tradables 
and B stands for net aggregate holdings of foreign assets. IN,s represents total investment 
and KN,s total capital accumulated in the self-employed sector at date s. 
 
                                                 
10 It would be equivalent to consider the case where producers directly borrow capital from the 
representative consumer and the latter is the one who would take the investment decisions as shown in 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 














          ( 5 )  
 
relative intratemporal consumption depends only on the relative price p and not upon 
consumer's spending level where γ  indicates the weight of the traded good in the utility 
function and θ represents the constant (and strictly positive) elasticity of substitution 






























.          ( 6 )  
 
A rise in the relative price of nontradables causes growth in tradables consumption 
growth relative to nontradables consumption.
12  
  
Since, by assumption nontradables can only be consumed, in equilibrium 
consumption equals production in the self-employed sector. Substitution and the 
combination of the Euler equation for tradables consumption with the lifetime budget 
constraint of the representative consumer yield an expression for the optimal 












































































, ,     (7) 
 
where P is the price index P =  ] which is increasing in p. 
θ θ γ γ
− − − +
1 / 1 1 ] ) 1 ( [ p
 
                                                 
11 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, pp 226-235) for a full derivation. 
12 Note that if σ = θ, tradables consumption remains constant along the perfect foresight paths. 
  9 
2.3 Properties of the Model 
 
Before turning to the dynamics of the economy, we first describe its steady state 
equilibrium and assess the impact of permanent productivity and consumption shocks. 
We then introduce a wage rigidity in the salaried sector.  The results of all exercises are 
tabulated in Table 1.  
 
2.3.1 Shocks in the Long Run 
 
Productivity shocks are represented by a permanent variation in the A productivity 
scale coefficients and demand shocks by a permanent variation in the γ parameter.  In the 







). Log differentiation leads 
to the following results, assuming that initial p = 1 and initial γ is equal to one half.  
 
Relative Prices: Differentiating (4’) and aggregating across all j gives 
() 0 ˆ ˆ 1 * ˆ ˆ ˆ * = = − − + + r k A p N N α φ  
Although individual ability remains constant by assumption,   and hence the capital 
growth rate is the same for everyone, the labor reallocation after a shock results in a 
change in the pivotal individual so that   is no longer equal to zero for the labor force 
as a whole.  By the same logic  
0 ˆ = j φ
* ˆ φ
T N N w k A p ˆ ˆ * ˆ ˆ ˆ * = + + + α φ  
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 close to 1, 
the real exchange rate is determined by the relative rates of productivity growth.  
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In order to simplify the analysis we assume that total financial wealth remains constant 
across steady states. We assume implicitly that any variation in the total level of physical 
capital is fully offset by an equal, but opposite variation in foreign assets holdings. That 
is, with international borrowing, a rise in the stock of physical capital for instance, can be 
financed by an equal fall in B without affecting the level of total financial wealth
13. This 
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Changes in nontradables consumption can be written as   
() () p Z C N ˆ 1 ˆ
^ ^
γ θγ γ − + − + − =  
and changes in total production in the self-employment sector (expressed in units of 
tradables) by 







= p A pY N
N
N . 
                                                 
13 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chap. 4) for an application. 
  11Since nontradable goods market equilibrium requires that  ,  the entrepreneurial 
ability of the pivotal worker, and implicitly, the share of the workforce in tradables, can 
be written as:   
N N Y C ˆ ˆ =
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Relative Earnings: The change in self-employment production expressed in tradables 
units is now: 






































2 . The relative change in total production also corresponds to 
the relative variation in entrepreneurs’ earnings, wNj, as the latter is a constant proportion 
of the former. The change in average self-employment production expressed in terms of 
tradables units can be written as: 
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. It is straightforward to verify that  2 3 Ω < Ω . 
 
 
  122.3.2 Dynamics 
 
In order to qualify the dynamics of the model in the event of a shock, we linearize 
the first order conditions for profit maximization by the self-employed around the steady 
state. The latter being characterized by  1 = q  (q denotes the shadow price of installed 
capital in nontradables) and,  j k  we obtain 
( j
t







= − + )           
() () () ( ) [] ( j t j j N t j
j
N t t k k k r q k
k h






+ − = − + , 1 1 1 1 1 α
χ
α ) .     
 
The equations Δkj = 0 and Δqj = 0 characterize the equilibrium dynamics. They are 
depicted in a two-equation phase diagram in q and kj that shows the dynamics of the 
investment decisions of self-employed individuals (figure 2). The line denoted by SS 
indicates the perfect foresight path.  
 
As the steady state level of investment chosen by each individual is not identical, 
we expect to observe that a common shock affects heterogeneous individuals differently. 
When a shock leads to a contraction of the self-employment sector, for workers whose 
entrepreneurial ability falls below the threshold steady state value of φ* (those who 
would be better off in the wage work sector), the perfect foresight path leads to zero 
capital and zero capital shadow value at steady state, as depicted in figure 3. Should self-








0 - independent of the wage 
prevailing in the salaried sector since the initial shadow value of their capital is above 1 
(q0=1/r ). Due to heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability, workers will not all move across 
sectors in the same period. For instance, in the case of a shock leading to a rise in returns 
to self-employment, more able entrepreneurs in the salaried sector would move first. A 
detailed analysis is presented in Appendix 2.  
 
  13The adjustment to the steady state depends on the relative values of σ  and θ.  
Indeed, CT,t is given by (7) which suggests that the level of tradables consumption along 
the saddle path is affected by variations in p in a manner that could either reinforce or 
offset the impact of a shock. The impact of a rise in p on consumption is dampened by 
consumers’ inter-temporal choices if σ >θ , and amplified if σ <θ.  If σ >θ, consumption 
of nontradables declines slower than consumption of tradables. The opposite occurs if 
σ <  θ. This implies that migration takes longer in a situation when inter-temporal 
substitution prevails over intra-temporal substitution.  
 
2.4 Responses to Productivity and Demand Shocks 
 
  In order to define short/medium term properties we need to qualify "on-impact" 
effects of various shocks. Short/medium term properties would then reflect variables' 
behavior after impact and during the transition towards the new steady state. On impact, 
levels of production and consumption must remain constant. Thus any wealth effects 
generated by the shock must be offset by an instantaneous change in prices. In order to 
simplify the analysis, we assume that changes in wealth occurring on impact reflect only 
the shock’s direct effects.
14 That is, changes in wealth due to subsequent changes in 
prices are accounted for in the long run. This assumption does not affect qualitatively the 
properties of the model. 
 
  We first assess the impact of permanent productivity and consumption shocks. 
We then introduce wage rigidities in the salaried sector. The results of all exercises are 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Productivity Shock to the Tradables Sector 
A productivity shock to the tradables sector,  ,   and  , 
increases both production of the sector as well as returns to capital and labor. This 
0
^
> T A 0
^
= N A 0
^
= γ
  14increases demands for both types of goods and causes the exchange rate to appreciate (p 
rises) to clear the nontradables market. In addition, along the perfect foresight adjustment 
path, some self-employed find it more profitable to move to the salaried sector.
15 The 
shadow value of their capital falls below 1 and, as it falls towards zero in the long run 
they disinvest. However, since capital adjusts with a lag, they cannot migrate until their 
capital has been completely dismantled. Tradable firms must also wait for the following 
period to adjust their capital. Therefore, on impact only prices adjust
16 and average self-
employed earnings follow the initial rise in p.  As the economy adjusts, self-employed 
earnings fall relative to salaried sector wages
17 as does the share of workers in self-
employment.
18 Hence, in both the short run and long run, wT / wN increases, LT / LN 
increases and, consistent with Balassa-Samuelson, p rises relative to its initial level. 
 
Productivity Shock to the Nontradables Sector 
Consistent with standard models, if  ,  , and  , in the steady 
state, the relative price of nontradables will decrease in proportion to the productivity 
shock in nontradables. Both capital intensity and earnings in the self-employed sector 
0
^
= T A 0
^
> N A 0
^
= γ
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15 Workers whose sequence of returns from self-employment remains above that of the salaried wage face 










= . This corresponds to an initial rise in average earnings in the informal 
sector. The initial rise in formal wages is equal to   and remains larger than the rise in self-employed 
average earnings for reasonable values of θ and γ. 
T A ˆ
17 Total self-employed production and earnings, measured in tradables units, depends on the sign of 
() ( ) ( [ [ 1 1 1 1 1
ˆ




T A ) ] ] . It is straightforward to check that the expression 








ˆ = , on average self-employed earnings fall in the 
long run relative to workers earnings in the salaried sector for any value of  2 Ω  and θ.  
 
18 In the steady state the direction of change of the employment share of self-employment depends on the 
sign of  () ( ) ( [ 1 1 1 1 ) ] − − − + − + θ γ α ϕ ϕ N se LT . The expression is unambiguously negative implying 
that the share of self-employed workers falls. 
  15will be left unchanged. However, on impact p rises due to increased demand for 
nontradables. It then falls along the transition path. This could be qualified as p 
undershooting. Individuals who are already self-employed at the time of the shock and 
who, with perfect foresight know that relative prices will continue to fall, do not modify 
their capital stock (their shadow value q remains equal to unity), but the increase in 
productivity does, in the short run, increase their production and yield higher relative 
earnings. This induces migration from the tradables sector and will eventually drive 
returns back to the pre-shock level.
19 However, to attract the marginal entrepreneur to 
self-employment, relative earnings in this sector will rise. Hence, in both the short and 
the long run, wT / wN, , LT / LN   and p decrease. 
 
Shift in Preferences toward Nontradables 
A shift in consumer preference towards nontradables  ,   and   
increases self-employment and absolute as well as relative nontradables consumption. On 
impact, the increased demand for nontradables causes the exchange rate to appreciate,
0
^
= T A 0
^




and relative self-employed earnings and the shadow value of capital increase.  This 
attracts new entrepreneurs to the sector, expanding nontradables supply and driving the 
relative price of nontradables, p, back to its initial, relative productivity-determined level.  
However, because marginal entrepreneurs are attracted to the sector, relative self-
employment earnings must rise in the steady state. This represents an important case 
where both wT / wN and LT / LN fall with an initial appreciation and then continue to do so 
as the exchange rate depreciates again back to its initial level.   
 
Negative Salaried/Tradables Productivity Shock with Salaried Sector Wage 
Rigidities 
 
  Unions or mandatory minimum wages may introduce downward nominal wage 
rigidities in the salaried sector that can reverse some of the above findings. As the 
                                                 
) )
19 The sign of  ( ( θ γ − − 1 1  determines the impact on self-employment. It is positive for any positive 








p  and  .  0
^
< γ
  16derivation of the steady state is complex, detail is deferred to appendix A.1. In the case 
where  ,  , and  , a negative shock to tradables’ productivity puts 
downward pressure on nominal wages in the salaried sector. However, because of 
downward wage rigidities, consumption is not affected on impact and hence, there is no 
effect on relative prices, p.  But the salaried sector will eventually adjust through 
quantities and released labor will flow into the non-traded sector increasing its 
production, driving down p,  and reducing average self-employed earnings. For the 
already self-employed, the fall in p observed along the transition path, leads to 
disinvestment in capital. However, since there is now rationing in the salaried sector, 
migration to the salaried sector is not possible and workers with relatively low 
entrepreneurial ability will earn less than what they would in the salaried sector. Hence, 
average earnings in the self-employed sector have fallen relative to the salaried sector 
while the size of self-employment has increased: we should see w
0
^
< T A 0
^
= N A 0
^
= γ
T / wN  and LT / LN 
moving against each other.
21 This is the classic segmentation view: the informal sector 
absorbs released labor during downturns to which we also now add that p falls as well. 
There are some parameter values that can lead to appreciation and a positive comovement 
of the labor market series.  However, as detailed in appendix A.1, they are not very 
plausible and, while included for completeness they can be disregarded for most practical 
purposes. 
 
                                                 
21 As long as wages in the salaried workers do not adjust, average earnings in self-employment 
unambiguously fall with respect to the former. Then, along the transition towards steady state, average 
earnings in the self-employed sector have fallen relative to the salaried sector while the size of self-
employment has increased. As mentioned in the previous section, this is also true in the new steady state if 
appendix A.1, condition (1) is satisfied. 
  173. Empirics  
 
The previous section shows that very standard models anchored in the mainstream 
literature yield clear hypotheses of comovements among the three series.  Two 
conclusions are important. First, independent of skill heterogeneity and adjustment costs, 
under no conditions can we generate a counter movement of relative sector sizes and 
earnings in the absence of a wage rigidity: observed counter movements imply 
segmentation and if we detect them empirically, this is evidence of labor market 
distortions.  Second, in all cases, the short run labor market dynamics move in the same 
direction as the steady state and only in the case of a shock to preferences for 
nontradables does the exchange rate overshoot in the short-run.   
 
We explore the patterns of comovement between relative sector sizes, relative 
earnings and the real exchange rate for Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and Colombia using 
the multivariate Johansen (1988) approach. (see appendix A.3). Although cointegration is 
sometimes given the economic interpretation of capturing “long run” relations, as 
Granger (1991) and Hakkio and Rush argue (1991) at core it is a statistical relationship 
existing among non-stationary series that can occur at any frequency or span.
22 In our 
case, relative sector sizes, earnings and the real exchange rate are plausibly non-
stationary and integrated of order of one and they always appear to be so in the 
analysis.
23 Since overshooting or undershooting (as found in the case of a productivity 
shock or a demand shock respectively to the nontradables sector) can take a number of 
years to return to long run equilibrium, our short/medium runs can, in fact, represent 




                                                 
22 See  Hakkio and Rush (1991) Cointegration: How long is the long-run?: "Clearly, the length of the 
'long-run' may vary between problems, that is, for some issues the long- run may be a matter of decades 
while for others a matter of months." 
23  Theoretically, however, it is legitimate to include an I(0) variable in the cointegrating relationship, 
although we would expect at least one cointegrating vector to emerge that captures simply the stationary 
series.  In practice, these series were never stationary across our sample and the problem was moot. 
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3.1 Data 
 
We use quarterly data for Mexico, Brazil and Colombia and semi-annual data for 
Argentina (see Appendix A.4 for data definitions and details) to generate the earnings 
ratio of salaried over self-employed workers, wT / wN , and the ratio of the absolute size of 
the salaried over the self-employed sector, LT / LN .  To the degree possible, we try to be 
consistent across surveys and in spirit be close to the traditional ILO definition based on 
firm size and the more recent focus on labor protections: we treat the male population 
that reports being employed in firms of greater than 6 workers as salaried (tradable) 
workers. Own-account workers or heads of firms employing fewer than 5 employees 
paying no social security contributions and excluding professionals and technicians, 
constitute the informal self-employed (nontradable) sector.  Real exchange rates, p, were 
taken from International Financial Statistics. The series are plotted in Figure 1 with the 
exchange rate inverted for greater graphical clarity (an upward movement here and here 
alone is a depreciation).  
 
Three issues merit note.  First, even if remuneration is equalized in both sectors, 
we do not observe non-monetary remuneration (independence, benefits foregone, taxes 
avoided, implicit returns to capital, etc.) and hence we may observe a wedge in observed 
returns even in equilibrium. We assume that these non-monetary components are a 
constant fraction of monetary earnings and hence that changes in relative monetary 
earnings are a good proxy for relative changes in total remuneration.  Second, variations 
in definitions and the composition of payment can cause substantial differences in ratios 
of relative earnings across countries.  As a final caveat, we do not model or study those 
salaried workers who are uncovered by labor legislation and hence are informal.  The 




  19We begin by estimating separate VAR models for Argentina, Mexico, Brazil and 
Colombia. We include a constant, lags for p, wT / wN and LT/LN  as well as time dummies 
in the cointegration space. These specifications prove sufficient to produce random 
errors. The specifications for the three models are presented in Tables A.1-A.3 in the 
Appendix A.4 along with tests for long-run exclusion, stationarity and weak-exogeneity. 
All variables appear to be non-stationary and the diagnostics on the residuals appear 
reasonable in terms of autocorrelation and normality. Sensitivity analysis for different lag 
lengths and with and without dummies sustain the robustness of the findings. Trace tests 
(λ trace) indicate one significant cointegrating vector for all three models (Table A.4). 
Normalizing the cointegration vectors on the 1
st element, yields the estimates for the βs 
(Table 2) as a cointegration vector that can be read as:
 
 
 LT/LN  + βW wT / wN  + βp p + βC = 0 
 
Table 1 suggests that the regimes predicted by the model correspond to four possible 
cointegration vectors.  “A” corresponds to productivity shocks to one or the other sectors 
in the presence of a integrated (non-segmented) labor market captured by βW  < 0.  “B” 
corresponds to a demand shock and the resulting over (under) shooting in the case of shift 
in preferences toward (away from) nontradable/informal goods.  Again, βW  < 0 since 
labor markets adjust freely, but  βp  > 0  corresponds to the reverse movement exchange 
rate in this case.  “C” corresponds to the case of a negative shock to the formal sector 
where wages cannot adjust downward and the labor market becomes segmented, βW  > 0: 
the two labor variables move oppositely- workers are shed from the tradables/formal 
sector and rationed into the nontradable/informal sector depressing relative earnings in 
that sector. βp > 0 since the exchange rate depreciates.  “D” corresponds to the long run 
version of  “B” where capital has moved to equalize rates of return, expanding production 
of nontradables and hence lowering their relative price again rendering  βp= 0: taste 
changes have no long run effect on the exchange rate.  We identify three regimes in the 
data plus one more that will be discussed later.  Since we deal with 10 separate periods, 
we will discuss only a few in detail.    
 
  20The estimates across the whole sample are presented in the first column of each 
country panel of table 2.  However, the theoretical model suggests that different shocks, 
or differing degrees of formal sector rigidities, should lead to different regimes and hence 
different cointegration vectors across subsamples.  To investigate the stability of the 
cointegration space, we follow Hansen and Johansen (1993, 1999). We perform 
backward and forward recursions stability to explore the stability of the cointegration 
space at both sample ends.  In the event of parameter instability, we then test for specific 
cointegrating vectors across subperiods.   
 
For Argentina, the Hansen and Johansen tests identify no significant change in 
cointegration coefficients across the sample. The full sample estimations are reported in 
table 2 and suggest a classic segmented labor market that corresponds to regime “C”. The 
comovements of the series, βW > 0, βp < 0 appear driven by shocks to the formal sector in 
the presence of binding wage rigidities. This is arguably consistent with the very high 
rates of unemployment that rose from roughly 6.5% in 1991 to 18% in 1995 and 
remained in the high double digits for much of the rest of our sample period.    
 
However, recursive estimations of the cointegration space in the other three 
country cases do suggest significant coefficient instability. Due to the existence of these 
multiple regimes, we label the full sample estimates “mixed” even though the estimated 
vector may suggest a particular regime.  
 
Taking the full sample, Colombia presents a case similar to Argentina with βW > 0 
suggesting segmentation in the labor market. The sub-period from 1997-04, in particular 
is consistent with a classic segmented market and productivity shocks to the formal sector 
driving the movements of the three series.  Colombia, in fact, entered a severe recession 
in the late 1990s concomitant with a sharp rise in the real minimum wage.  The latter was 
driven by indexing wages to a forecast of inflation that later turned out to be 
pessimistically high by a substantial margin.  Although the coefficient on  βp is not 
estimated precisely, Figure 1 shows a classic case of regime “C” across this period where 
  21the two labor market series are very clearly moving against each other while the 
exchange rate depreciates.  
 
The backward recursion test suggests, however, that this vector is not stable 
across the whole period and we identify two other regimes. In the intermediate 1991-
1996 period, we find βW  < 0 suggesting the labor market is behaving in an integrated 
fashion and the βp > 0 consistent with an increase in relative informal sector size and 
earnings driven by a positive demand shock to the informal/nontradable sector.  In this 
example of regime “B,” informality is “procyclical.” 
 
A similar pattern appears broadly to characterize the full sample in Mexico: βW is 
not significant suggesting the absence of significant segmentation, and as in Colombian, 
sub sample, βp > 0.  This regime “B” pattern is most sharply visible in the period 1987-
1991:  βW is very significantly < 0 suggesting an integrated labor market, and βp, > 0 is 
consistent with the expansion of the informal sector across this period being driven by a 
positive consumption shock to the nontradable sector and attracting more workers into 
informality. Again, the estimates are consistent with the evolution of the series in Figure 
1.  Both this and the 1991-1996 period in Colombia, are consistent with a view where a 
period of liberalization of the capital account in the context of broader reforms leads to an 
upward revision of permanent income and an ability to borrow that led to a relative rise in 
consumption in non tradables.  This leads to a reallocation of labor toward the 
informal/tradables sector and an appreciation of the exchange rate.    
 
However, the forward recursive tests for parameter stability suggest that the 
relation changes entering the early 1990s.  In fact, the subperiod 1992-96, shows the 
emergence of the classic segmented regime with a negative shock to tradables in the 
presence of labor market rigidities “C” found in Colombia in the 1997-04 period as 
Mexico slides towards, and then is engulfed by the 1994 Tequila crisis.  In contrast to the 
previous period,  βW > 0 suggesting an emerging segmentation across this period. This is 
consistent with the idea of a slowing formal/tradables sector and an inability to 
downwardly adjust earnings across, especially, the crisis period.   
  22 
Figure 1 does, however, suggests that were we able to break this period into 
smaller sub-samples, the labor market segmentation would be preserved, but the 
exchange rate correlation might change, and that is it the major depreciation of the peso 
in 1994-95 that is driving the positive sign on  βp. That is, rather than depreciating as in 
the Colombian 1997-2004 case, the lead up to the crisis suggests that the exchange rate 
was appreciating.  This gives us a combination, as in the Colombian case of 1985-90, 
where βp < 0, not found in table 1.  What we postulate to be driving this are nominal 
rigidities in the nominal exchange rate that are outside of the purview of the model. In 
both Mexico and in Colombia (see Fiess and Shankar, forthcoming) this was a period 
where the nominal ER was managed and hence impeded the real adjustments dictated by 
the model.
24    
 
The backward recursive tests signal that this new model is distinct from that 
found after 1996 and, in fact, we again find an integrated labor market beginning in 1999.  
However, the exchange rate is now enters negatively putting us in regime “A” where it is 
productivity shocks rather than demand shocks that drive the system.  This is consistent 
with the slowdown of the US economy across this period on which the Mexican export 
sector is very dependent.  Formal exporters thus would have felt the equivalent of a 
negative productivity shock to the tradables sector, leading to both a depreciation and a 
reallocation in a relatively undistorted labor market toward the informal/tradables sector. 
 
Brazil presents additional examples of these regimes although the graphical 
depictions of the series are much less clear than in the other cases. Though the full 
sample model points to an overall integrated labor market, the recursive tests suggest 
again, roughly three periods to be examined.  In the first, roughly 1983-87, βW  > 0 
suggests an integrated labor market and, combined with βp < 0, is consistent with regime 
“A” and a series of productivity shocks across the period driving the system. However, 
from 1989-93, βW  > 0, βp > 0 as in the Colombian and Mexican crises, suggesting a 
  23negative shock to the tradables sector with rigidities in the labor market impeding 
adjustment and segmenting the market, regime “C”.  This, in fact, was a period of deep 
recession in Brazil beginning around 1990. 
 
We return to an integrated labor market in the 1998-02 period. This sub-period 
seems again consistent with relative sector allocations and earnings determined by 
sectoral productivity shocks, Regime “A”.    
 
The sub-periods studied in the four countries identify cointegrating relationships 
consistent, in most cases, with scenarios generated by the model presented in section 2.  
As importantly, in three of the four countries, we identify periods where the informal and 
formal labor markets appear to be integrated. That is, the informal sector does not appear 
to be the residual of a segmented market, but rather a competing sector that workers may 
choose to enter depending on relative rates of return to their assets.  This is consistent 
with recent work studying patterns of transition among the formal and informal sectors in 
Mexico and Brazil that find that worker flows correspond much more to those in the US 
patterns of reallocation across jobs.   That is, flows in both directions are very high and 
increase in upturns and slow in downturns.
25   
 
Other evidence on the prevalence of rigidities in the cases where the job market 
appears segmented are also consistent with our findings.  For instance, while clearly not 
exhausting plausible rigidities, kernel plots testing for how binding minimum wages are 
suggest that in the late 1990s Brazil and Mexico when labor markets appear integrated, 
they were not while in Colombia, which behaves as segmented in this period, they were 
among the most binding in the region.
26  Further, the periods of apparent segmentation in 
Brazil, Colombia and Mexico correspond to periods of deep recession where, as is often 
the case, wages do not adjust enough to prevent unemployment or, in this case, 
segmentation.   
                                                                                                                                                 
24 As our Argentine sample also spans a period of anchoring the peso to the dollar, it is perhaps surprising 
that the data do not support a similar pattern there however, were we to be able to estimate with the few 
observations between 1990 and 2002, it might surface.   
25 See Bosch and Maloney (2006), Bosch, Goni and Maloney (2007). 
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We find several episodes where the informal sector appears to expand 
concomitant with a rise in its relative earnings, during upturns.  That is, it is procyclical.   
Loayza and Rigolini do find some countries in their global panel, for which self 
employment (also their measure of informality) is procyclical, however the majority are 
not.  Since, for both Colombia and Mexico (insignificantly) full sample findings of 
segmentation conceal periods of integration and procyclicality, we suspect that their 
sample averages are similarly concealing some more complex cyclical stories.  The same 
can be said about the cross sectional correlations found in Boeri and Gribaldi.  Hence 
empirically, the various papers are probably not necessarily inconsistent.   Conceptually, 
our guess is that were most of the discussed models to add a second sector, their models 





  This paper has offered an integrated view of the developing country labor market 
and its behavior across macroeconomic fluctuations.  We model a two-sector labor 
market in a Rogoff-Obstfeld small economy model to include heterogeneous 
entrepreneurial ability and credit constraints to entering informal self-employment.   This 
allows us to generate a set of hypotheses about the comovement of relative sector sizes 
and earnings and sectoral shocks as captured by the real exchange rate.   
 
  These patterns of comovement are then tested in a cointegration framework in 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. Three important findings emerge. First, we find 
examples of all the cointegration vectors suggested by theory suggesting that attention to 
country and period context is important to approaching the informal sector.  In particular, 
and second, although the informal self-employed and formal salaried sectors often appear 
as elements of segmented or dual labor markets as customarily envisaged, we also find 
numerous episodes where they appear as one integrated labor market: numerous periods 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 See Maloney and Nunez (2004) 
  25show strong comovement between relative sector sizes and earnings.  This suggests that a 
large component of the informal sector should not be viewed as somehow inferior or 
queuing for formal sector employment.  However, it is also the case that rigidities in the 
formal salaried sector can become very binding, as is most clearly the case in the 
dramatic crises that affected all four countries at some period, and apparently in 
Argentina across the entire sample. Third, these distinct patterns suggest that the pro or 
countercyclicality of the sectors may depend on the sectoral origin of the shocks, and the 
presence of binding wage rigidities.  We find numerous examples where either a positive 
productivity or demand shock to the nontradables/informal sector leads to its expansion. 
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Table 1: Predicted Patterns of Comovement among Relative Earnings, Relative     
Sector Sizes, and the Real Exchange Rate  
Short / 
Medium Run 
  Δ ( wT / wN )  Δ( LT / LN )  Δp 
Cointegrating 
Vector 
ΔAT > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0  1, < 0,< 0 
ΔAN > 0 
< 0  < 0 
< 0 
(undersh.) 




Δγ< 0  < 0  < 0 
0 >  
(oversh.) 
1, < 0,> 0 
Wage Rigidities  ΔAT < 0  > 0  < 0  < 0  1, > 0,> 0 
       
Long Run        
ΔAT > 0  > 0  > 0  > 0  1, < 0,< 0 




Δγ< 0  < 0  < 0  0  1, < 0, 0 
Wage Rigidities  ΔAT < 0  > 0  < 0  < 0  1, > 0,> 0 31
 
 
Table 2: Cointegration Coefficients among  Relative Sector Sizes, Relative Earnings, and the Real Exchange Rate  
 Argentina  Brazil  Colombia  Mexico 
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(A)




 Δ AT  
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ΔAT < 0 
Rigidities 
(C)
Mixed  Δγ 
SR 
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Note: Cointegration vectors between relative tradable/nontradables (Formal/Informal Self-employment) size measured in employment,  
relative tradable/nontradable earnings, and the real exchange rate.  Vector presented as  LT/LN  + βW wT / wN  + βp p + βC = 0. 
 (t-statistics in parentheses). 
 
 
 Figure 1: Relative Sector Shares and Earnings, Real Exchange Rate 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own estimates based on ENEU (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano) and IFS. 
 
Notes: Wage F/SE captures the relative earnings of the formal salaried vs informal self employed 
sector. Formal/SE captures the relative size of these sectors as a ratio of employed population. 
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  34Appendix A.1: Details on Negative Tradables Productivity Shock with Salaried 
Sector Wage Rigidities 
 
Unions or mandatory minimum wages may introduce downward nominal wage 
rigidities in the salaried sector that can reverse many of the findings above. 
A negative shock to productivity in the tradables sector translates into nominal 
wage downward pressures in the salaried sector. Nominal wage downward rigidities, if 
persistent, would lead to a non-optimal and thus unstable equilibrium. In order to obtain a 
possibly stable equilibrium, we assume that nominal wages are adjusted to satisfy the first 
order conditions of firms operating in the tradables sector. However, we assume that 
wage variations represent the last element of adjustment. That is, labor movements are 
precluded after wages have been adjusted. As a consequence, the pivotal individual could 
end up in a situation where belonging to either one or the other sector does make a 
difference. This is a case of segmentation where the nontradables sector behaves in part 
as a residual sector.  
As both capital and labor are assumed not to move instantaneously, two 
adjustment scenarios are possible. In the first scenario, capital would move first, then 
labor and finally wages. In that scenario, capital adjustment is a two-step process. Capital 
first adjusts to meet (1) in a context of constant salaried labor force. It further adjusts to 
meet (1) considering labor variation obtained by solving (2) with constant wage. Wages 
adjust in a final stage to satisfy (2). In the second scenario, labor would move first, then 
capital and finally wages. In that scenario, capital adjustment is one-step process. Capital 
adjusts to meet (1) after salaried labor has changed to meet (2) with constant capital and 
wage. Wages adjust to meet (2) after labor and capital adjusted. We can expect results to 
be qualitatively similar, as we expect factors of production adjustments to be identically 
signed in both scenarios.  
Taking for instance the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, salaried 
labor outflow
27 in the first scenario corresponds to 
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The sign of both real exchange rate and average earnings depends upon the sign and 
magnitude of expression  ( ) ( ) ( ) γ γθ α ϕ α − + − + − 1 1 N se N . This expression is increasing 
with  θ,  the elasticity of substitution. For θ=1  (preferences are Cobb-Douglas) for 
instance, the expression is equal to 
se ϕ − 1 . In that case, both the real exchange rate and 
average self-employed earnings are decreasing unambiguously. A sufficient condition for 













se . Unless 
N α  and θ are both very 
close to zero and γ very close to one the condition is likely to be always satisfied. 
However, the sufficient condition for both the relative price of nontradables and average 
earnings to be decreasing is more restrictive, namely θ ≤ 1. Average earnings in the self-
employment sector could rise despite the fall in p because in the context of an expansion 
of the sector the contribution per unit of entrepreneurial ability is higher for less able 
workers. This is a feature of the model essentially due to the fact that ability enters in a 
linear manner in the production function of self-employed workers.  
As far as relative earnings are concerned, self-employed workers would become on 
average worst off with respect to salaried workers if  
 
( ) ( )
() ( ) ()
( LT
N se N
se LT LT η
φ
φ
















− + − + −





1 2 )      (1) 
 

























2 )          
 
This condition is likely to be satisfied for any plausible set of parameters values. 
 
In the second scenario, we obtain 

































The real exchange rate and average self-employed earnings vary according to 
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Conditions presented in the case of the first scenario also apply to the second scenario. 
 
When conditions presented above are satisfied, as labor migrates towards the self-
employed sector, production rises, the real exchange rate depreciates, and average 
earnings in the self-employed sector fall. Moreover, as workers cannot migrate back to 
the salaried sector, those whose entrepreneurial ability is relatively low earn less than 
what they would get in the salaried sector. For those workers “trapped” in the self--
employed sector earnings performance has worsened relative to those employed in the 
salaried sector as earnings in the salaried sector are preserved by institutional rigidities. 
The two labor force series move against each other. Critically, the same result would hold 
in the case where indexation of wages to past inflation forces salaried sector wages above 




Appendix A.2: Migration Timing 
 
Because we assume that the self-employed individual, who is willing to move to the 












































































































Labor could adjust within the first period following the shock. However, because individuals are 
non homogenous when producing in the self-employed  sector, the optimal time for leaving the 
latter may differ across workers. 
The Left Hand Side of the above expression is increasing with entrepreneurial ability. 
Namely, more able individuals earn more than less able ones. Then the opportunity cost of 
migrating to the salaried sector at time t, without considering the direct migration costs 
corresponding to capital disinstallation, is increasing in the level of entrepreneurial capability. 
The last term of the RHS, which represents the present value of labor earnings in the salaried 
sector is identical for all individuals at time t. However, the first term of the RHS is likely to be 
different. The sign of the partial derivative of the latter with respect to φ




























If the above expression appears to be positive, that would imply that the cost of migrating to the 
salaried sector at time is increasing with the level of entrepreneurial capability. If this is the case, 
then  the total cost of migration is unambiguously increasing with φ
 j . As a consequence we may 
expect more able entrepreneurs to postpone their migration towards the wage sector with respect 
to less able ones. 
In the case of a shock leading to an expansion of the self-employed sector, migration can 
occur within the first period following the shock, even though capital accumulation may take 
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Following arguments similar to those presented above, we can infer that more able entrepreneurs 




Appendix A.3: Details of Johansen Cointegration Procedure 
 
The Johansen procedure allows us to test for cointegration in a multivariate 
system. Starting from an unrestricted vector autoregressive model (VAR), the hypothesis 
of cointegration is formulated as a hypothesis of reduced rank of the long run impact 
matrix   (Johansen, 1988, Johansen and Juselius, 1990). The VAR is generated by the 
vector z
Π
t, which defines the potential endogenous variables of the model, in our case, the 
three series. Taking first differences of the variables, the VAR can be transformed into an 
error correction model 
 
ΔΓ Δ Γ Δ Π Σ zz z zD I N ttk t k t k t t t =+ + + + + −− − = − 11 1 1 0 ... , ~ ( , ) ψ ε ε   
 
where the estimates of  ) 1 ,..., 1 ( ), ... ( 1 − = − − − − = Γ k i A A I i i  describe the short run 
dynamics to changes in zt and Π = − − − − ( ... ) IA A i 1 captures the long run adjustments 
and D contains deterministic terms.  
 
Cointegration occurs in the case of reduced rank of Π. If the rank is reduced (r<n) 
it is possible to factorize   into  Π Π (' ) = αβ  where α  denotes the adjustment coefficients 
and β  the cointegration vectors. The cointegration vectors β  have the property that β ' zt 
is stationary even though zt itself is non-stationary.  If the rank is reduced it is also 
possible to interpret the VAR in first differences as a vector error correction model and to 
obtain estimates of α  and β  via the reduced rank regression. Since the rank of Π is 
equal to the number of independent cointegration vectors and the rank of Π is also equal 
to the number of non-zero eigenvalues, the test of cointegration thus amounts to a test for 
  38  39
the number of non-zero eigenvalues. The trace statistics,λ trace, is a non-standard 
distributed likelihood-ratio test, which is commonly used to determine the number of 
cointegration vectors, (Johansen, 1988). The trace statistic tests the null hypothesis that 
there are at most r cointegration vectors: 
      H0:  i λ =0, for i = r+1,..n  
where only the first r eigenvalues, λ , are non-zero against the unrestricted hypothesis 
that   n.
28
                                                 
'
28 The null hypothesis of at most r cointegration vectors implies that there are  n-r unit roots and, 
theoretically, n-r zero eigenvalues. This is because the hypothesis of cointegration is formulated as the 
reduced rank of 
⊥ β are n×(n-r)  matrices orthogonal to 
αβ = ⊥ ⊥ Π  and the full rank of 
α  and  β . This allows us then to distinguish between r 
+cointegrating I(0) relations and n-r non-cointegrating I(1) relations.  
α Γβ ' , where α  and  β are n× r matrices and  ⊥ α  and Appendix A.3  Details on Data 
 
Country  Survey Time  Coverage 
and Frequency 
Spatial Coverage  Sample  Definition of Formal Sector All 
who  declared: 
Definition of S.E. Sector 
All who  declared: 
Brazil Pesquisa  Mensal 




From first quarter 
of 1983 to fourth 
quarter of 2002 
 
Each quarter is 
represented by 
the last month of 
that quarter. 
6 major metropolitan 
regions (covering 
25% of the national 
labor market): Paulo, 
Rio de Janeiro, Belo 
Horizonte, Porto 
Alegre, Recife and 
Salvador. 
Males above 
15 years old 
 
- to be working or to have a work 
during the survey's week 
- to be employees in their work 
- to have a work-card (carteira de 
trabalho) 
- to have NOT a work-card and to 
be working in some activity 
related to the public sector  
- to be working or to have 
a work during the survey's 
week 
- to be employers 






Survey of Urban 
Employment) 
From first quarter 
of 1987 to fourth 
quarter of 2004 
 
16 major urban areas, 
covering 60% of 
urban population 
Males between 
11 and 99 
years 
- to be employees of firms with 
more than 5 employees(*) with 
social benefits 
- to be owners of firms with more 
than 5 employees 
-  to be commission workers with 
social benefits 
- to be owners of firms 
with 5 or less employees 
- to be  self employed  
- to be commission 
workers without benefits 
Argentina Encuesta 
Permanente de 





wave of 1985  to 
first wave of 
2003  (two waves 
per year, one in 
May, one in 
October) 
Gran Buenos Aires  Males between 
12 and 75 
years 
 
- to be working during the 
survey's period 
- to be employees in their work 
- to have a pension plan in their 
current employment 
 
- to be working or to have 
a work during the survey's 
week 
- to be self employed 
- to be employers in firms 








From first quarter 
of 1985 to second 
quarter of 2004 




Medellin, Cali, and 
Pasto) 
Males between 
11 and 99 
years with less 
than 12 years 
of 
education(***) 
Not possible to identify Formal 
Salaried, just Salaried: 
 
- those who declared to be  
working for a private firm or for 
the Government  
- to be employers 
- to be  self employed 
 
(*) Due to a modification in the questionnaire (1994), a firm is considered to be small if it has 6 or less workers for all periods before to third quarter of 1994. 
(**)Employers in big firms were dropped to avoid unnecessary pro-cyclicality in formal wages. These individuals account for a reduced number so the sector 
sizes are not affected after dropping them (e.g. in 2003 I, 2.7% of the formal workers were employers in big firms) 
(***)All observations with incomplete monetary income declarations are dropped from the sample 





Test for Long-Run Exclusion: 
) (
2 r χ LR-Test ( ) 
Test for Stationarity: 
) (
2 r p− χ LR-Test ( ) 
Test for Weak-Exogeneity: 
) (
2 r χ LR-Test ( ) 
Model Specification:  r  1 2 1  2  1  2 
  dgf  2 1 2  1  2  1 
  ) 5 (
2 χ   3.84 5.99 5.99  3.84  3.84  5.99 
             
Mexico  nT/nN 16.97 18.67 37.96  2.74 0.57 1.92 
Lag length: 4  WT/WN 10.54 12.11 38.52  3.28  12.06  12.49 
Dummies  :  P  26.06 27.82 35.22  2.87  21.22  22.03 
1995 Q1  Constant  12.6  14.4         
(Peso  Crisis)             
             
Brazil  nT/nN 10.27 12.97 15.05  5.85  17.34  23.6 
Lag Length: 3  WT/WN 4.23 12.94 16.3  3.19  1.69  6.89 
Dummies: P  13  13.3  14.8  6.3  0.13  3.1 
1994 Q2, 1991 Q1  Constant  12  12         
(Currency conversion from 
Cruzerio Real to Real; Real 
Devaluation)             
             
Colombia  nT/nN 21.58 23.38 28.18  2.91 4.42 5.94 
Lag Length: 2  WT/WN 11.25 13.13 27.76  2.5  4.43  13.32 
Dummies:  P  12.81 15.27 28.96  4.1  0.42 7.60 
1992Q1, 994Q1   Constant  20.6  23.1         
             
Argentina  nT/nN 8.78 13.24  31.54  5.32  18.33  24.01 
Lag Length: 4  WT/WN 27.01 33.06  23.8  2.98 0.34 6.84 
  P  10.23 11.62 32.07  5.88 1.34  2.2 
 Constant  9.45  12.73         
             
 
  41               Table A.2: Multivariate Statistics (Residual Analysis) 
 Argentina  Mexico:  Brazil  Colombia 
Information Criteria:       
SC  -10.80 -21.09 -15.81  -13.37 
HQ  -11.99 -21.81 -16.52  -13.85 
Autocorrelation        
Ljung-Box:  2 χ (42) = 42.93, p-val. = 0.43 
2 χ (114) = 126.3, p-val. = 0.05 
2 χ (150) = 159, p-val.= 0.18 
2 χ (99) = 129.5, p-value = 0.02 
LM(1)  2 χ (9) = 8.98, p-value = 0.44 
2 χ (9) = 8.1, p-value = 0.53 
2 χ (9) = 4.52, p-value = 0.87 
2 χ (9) = 7.6, p –value = 0.58 
LM(4)  2 χ (9) = 7.62, p-value = 0.57 
2 χ (9) = 17.2, p-value = 0.05 
2 χ (9) = 13.1, p-value = 0.16 
2 χ (9) = 7.9, p –value = 0.54 
Normality  2 χ (6) = 9.29, p-value = 0.16 
2 χ (6) = 9.94, p-value = 0.13 
2 χ (6) = 16.4, p-value = 0.01 
2 χ (6) = 31.5, p-value = 0.00 
 
 
      
             Table A.3: Univariate Test Statistics (Residual Analysis) 
  Argentina  Mexico    Brazil     Colombia 
 n T/nN WT/WN p  nT/nN WT/WN p  nT/nN WT/WN p  nT/nN WT/WN p 
Skewness       -0.066  -0.446  0.718  -0.168  -0.574 0.567  0.2750  -0.1402  -0.014 
Kurtosis  1.965  2.339 4.815  2.345 3.785 3.940  2.682  4.118 4.765  5.8000  4.3100  3.8161 
ARCH  5.041  1.601 0.994  0.941 5.077 2.307  1.850  5.473 2.005  4.3170  2.7780  3.3060 
Normality  1.607  2.794 6.748  0.830 4.061 5.884  0.482  5.983 9.846  19.6240  7.6740  4.4030 
R
2 0.532  0.374 0.845  0.290 0.470 0.765  0.291  0.217 0.461  0.4050  0.3840  0.4110 
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Table A.4 















λ trace test         
































Note: Trace statistics and p-values are small sample corrected (Johansen (2002)).  
* Trace statistics not adjusted for small sample properties reads: 42.64 (p-value=0.00)  
 
  43Table A.5 : Adjustment Coefficients 
  Argentina Brazil  Colombia  Mexico 
Sample 
Variables   
full  full  1983-87 1988-93 1998-02  Full  1991-1996 1997-04 1991-1996  Full  1987-91 1992-98 1999-04 

















































































Note:   indicates a variable in first differences. t statistics in parentheses.   Δ
 









1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003
forward recursion          
[base sample: 1987Q1 to
1993Q4]
backward recursion            
[base sample: 1998Q1 to
2004Q4]
 
Note: Parameter stability of cointegration spaces is assessed using Hansen and Johansen (1993, 1999). The test displayed is for constancy of full sample estimate 
as in Table 2, Interpretation is as follows, 1 presents the normalized critical value at the 5% level of significance. Values below 1 indicate parameter stability. 
Black doted line represent to test statistic based on backward recursion (using the period of 1998Q1 to 2004 Q4 as base sample and adding one period at a time 
until the start of the sample is reached.. The grey line represents the test statistics based on forward recursion (using period of 1987Q1 to 1993Q4 as base period 
and adding one observation at the time until the end of the sample is reached. Backward and forward recursions are used to in parallel to investigate parameter 
stability at the beginning and end of the sample. The full sample estimate points to integration, as such, we support integration pre 1991 and post 1997. During 
1992-1996 the full sample estimate of integration is rejected. This merits further subsample analysis. 
 






1984 1989 1994 1999
forward recursion          
[base sample: 1984Q1 to
1989Q4]
backward recursion         
[base sample: 1995Q1 to
2002Q4]
 
Note: Parameter stability of cointegration spaces is assessed using Hansen and Johansen (1993, 1999). The test displayed is for constancy of full sample estimate 
as in Table 2, Interpretation is as follows, 1 presents the normalized critical value at the 5% level of significance. Values below 1 indicate parameter stability. 
Black doted line represent to test statistic based on backward recursion (using the period of 1995Q1 to 2002 Q4 as base sample and adding one period at a time 
until the start of the sample is reached.. The grey line represents the test statistics based on forward recursion (using period of 1984Q1 to 1989Q4 as base period 
and adding one observation at the time until the end of the sample is reached. Backward and forward recursions are used to in parallel to investigate parameter 
stability at the beginning and end of the sample.  












1988 1993 1998 2003
forward recursion          
[base sample: 1985Q3 to
1995Q4]
backward recursion              
[base sample: 1996Q1 to
2004Q2]
 
Note: Parameter stability of cointegration spaces is assessed using Hansen and Johansen (1993, 1999). The test displayed is for constancy of full sample estimate 
as in Table 2, Interpretation is as follows, 1 presents the normalized critical value at the 5% level of significance. Values below 1 indicate parameter stability. 
Black doted line represent to test statistic based on backward recursion (using the period of 1996Q1 to 2004 Q2 as base sample and adding one period at a time 
until the start of the sample is reached.. The grey line represents the test statistics based on forward recursion (using period of 1985Q3 to 1995Q4 as base period 
and adding one observation at the time until the end of the sample is reached. Backward and forward recursions are used to in parallel to investigate parameter 
stability at the beginning and end of the sample.  
 









1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002
backward recursion             
[base sample: 1996H1 to
2003H1]
forward recursion          
[base sample: 1987H2 to
1994H1]
 
Note: Parameter stability of cointegration spaces is assessed using Hansen and Johansen (1993, 1999). The test displayed is for constancy of full sample estimate 
as in Table 2, Interpretation is as follows, 1 presents the normalized critical value at the 5% level of significance. Values below 1 indicate parameter stability. 
Black doted line represent to test statistic based on backward recursion (using the period of 1996H1 to 2003H1 as base sample and adding one period at a time 
until the start of the sample is reached.. The grey line represents the test statistics based on forward recursion (using period of 1987H2 to 1994H1 as base period 
and adding one observation at the time until the end of the sample is reached. Backward and forward recursions are used to in parallel to investigate parameter 
stability at the beginning and end of the sample.  
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